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Abstract
This paper constructs a firm-level dataset to document the prevalence of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in 27 European countries over the period 2002-2012.
We find government ownership of firms to be widespread over the European con-
tinent. On average we annually observe 35,596 firms with a state participation;
21,377 of these are majority-owned by the state. Notwithstanding an expected ten-
dency towards concentration in the mining, energy, transport, postal and telecom-
munication sectors, we do detect non-negligible government ownership in all sec-
tors of the business economy. Countries with a socialist legal origin show the high-
est number of SOEs and SOEs are present in almost all sectors. Countries with
an English legal origin show the lowest numbers of SOEs. Lower levels of eco-
nomic and financial development, and lower scores on institutional characteristics
are associated with higher levels of government ownership at country-level. More
collectivist societies also showhigher levels of government ownership. While SOEs
are on average larger than privately-owned firms (POEs), half of the SOEs employs
less than 50 people. Through a matching exercise we show that SOEs are outper-
formed by POEs in terms of 16 real and financial firm level indicators.This is no
longer the case when SOEs are listed or controlled by a foreign government. In
countries with better scores on institutional characteristics SOEs are generally less
outperformed by POEs. More collectivist societies are characterised by SOEs that
employ more people and pay higher wages, but are less efficient. In terms of em-
ployment growth SOEs are outperformed by POEs, but SOEs are more resilient in
times of crisis. Further SOEs have a lower propensity to exit which does not seem
to vary with the political orientation of the country.
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1 Introduction
The Great Depression andWorldWar II pushed governments into a more active role in
the economy. Many politicians believed the state should not only own telecommuni-
cations and postal services, utilities, airlines and railroads, but also strategic manufac-
turing industries. Economic arguments for state ownership rested on market failures
and the ability of state ownership to allow state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to pursue
socially desirable objectives. This view changed from the 1980s onwards when both
the perceived success of PM Thatcher’s government in privatizing the state-dominated
UK economy, and — especially — the collapse of the Soviet Union provided a pow-
erful impetus towards private ownership. During the 1990s and early 2000s market-
oriented policy-makers in the west also pushed the ‘Washington Consensus’ on de-
veloping countries. This blueprint prescription of 10 economic reforms included the
immediate privatization of SOEs (see Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and
Murrell (2002) for literature reviews).
The last 15 years, however, have witnessed a resurgence of state ownership due to the
rise of China and the Great Recession of the late 2000s, early 2010s. Though the over-
all level of state ownership in China has been declining for almost 40 years, in 2014 67
of the 69 Chinese companies in the list of the 500 largest companies in the world were
state-owned (Hsieh and Song (2015)). The sheer scale of China’s economic growth has
raised the global profile and attraction of their ‘state capitalism’modelwith the govern-
ment controlling Chinese champions in globally competitive industries. Further, policy
responses to the Great Recession involved nationalization of privately held firms. Fig-
ure 1 indeed confirms an increase in M&A transactions by governments/states in the
27 European countries in our dataset following the crisis in 2009. Even the US govern-
ment employed record levels of state ownership and fiscal stimulus. Although much
was reversed quickly, state ownership has remained considerably higher than before
the crisis in key industries, particularly in the EU (Megginson (2017)). Estimates sug-
gest that majority-owned SOEs account for about EUR 2 trillion of assets and more
than six million jobs in OECD member countries (OECD (2011)) and state ownership
of equity represents nearly 20% of stock market capitalization worldwide (Borisova
et al. (2012)).1
Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) put forward four rationales for state ownership of
firms. The industrial policy view rationalises state ownership as a means to correct
market failures. Government ownership in banks might for example alleviate credit
constraints for firms by allocating capital towards firms, whichmeet particular require-
ments (La Porta et al. (2002)).2 State investors may also steer investments towards ac-
tivities that yield the highest return for society or the state may act as a catalyst for
novel industries, hereby contributing to the development of new activities that ben-
efit society (Robinett, 2006). Moreover thanks to the government’s deep pockets, a
1In 2012, The Economist also devoted two longer articles to the increasing interference of governments
into the private sector (The Economist (2012a); The Economist (2012b)).
2The presumption that governments use banks to achieve political goals has been shown a number
of papers in several contexts. Carvalho (2014) for instance shows that in exchange for funding by gov-
ernment banks, Brazilian firms expand employment during election periods. This behaviour is certainly
not confined to developed countries, as Englmaier and Stowasser (2017) show increases in bank lending
in election periods. These authors however do not examine effects on the behaviour of lenders.
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Data source: Zephyr. The figure plots the number of M&A transactions in
the business economy for which the acquirer was listed as a government/state
entity in Zephyr. We single out M&A transactions with targets in the finan-
cial sector as this sector is not covered in our final dataset. Transactions are
restricted to those where the target’s and acquiror’s country is part of our
dataset.
government-owned firm might be shielded away from bankruptcy and as such might
be more eligible for bank funding (Boubakri and Saffar (2019)). Additionally these in-
vestors might shift a firm’s focus from the maximization of profit towards the achieve-
ment of other goals; for instance the preservation of employment in general or provi-
sion of employment for certain societal groups (Schleifer and Vishny (1994)). This is
the social view. The political view of state ownership emphasises government failure:
politicians maximize self-interest rather than societal welfare.3 Schleifer and Vishny
(1994) introduce a bargaining model where politicians and state firms’ managers bar-
gain over excess employment and subsidies both in environments characterised by
differential institutional strengths. Bennedsen (2000) suggest increased sensitivity to
pressure groups in SOEs, rather than the wider population of constituents. Some pa-
pers suggest the use of government-owned banks for political gains in elections (Cole
(2009); Carvalho (2014); Englmaier and Stowasser (2017)). Also government own-
ership in non-financial firms might be used to achieve political goals. Bertrand et al.
(2018) find that CEOs of French listed firms alter employment decisions of their firms
in order to support the re-election of connected politicians. For a broad European sam-
ple for firms, Borisova et al. (2012) provides evidence of inferior corporate governance
performance accompanying firms with government owners, suggesting fewer moni-
toring mechanisms which can be put in position in case of pursuance of political goals.
Finally, the path-dependence view explains the extent of state interventionism through
3Moreover the fact that politicians, besides being the owners of the firm, also act as regulators might
lead to a differential treatment in favour of state-owned firms.
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a country’s institutional and historical process (Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014)). The
fact that despite several rounds of privatisation, a fair amount of state shareholdings
still exist is in line with this view (see Megginson and Netter (2001)). Establishing
state shareholdings or efforts to reduce these need take into account the existing inter-
ests of various actors. E.g. both Durant and Legge Jr (2002) and (North, 1993, p7) have
found powerful actors to oppose privatisation for instance. Finally Megginson (2005)
adds the protection of technology as a rationale for the government to actively pursue
ownership in enterprises to the previous.
Academic research examining state ownership has evolved rapidly over the last ten
years (Megginson (2017)). However, it is has largely done so in a particular direction:
it hasmainly focused onChina and on awaver of indicatorsmeasuring financial perfor-
mance of either Chinese SOEs or a limited set of high profile privatisations. This paper
contributes to the literature by first building a large firm-level dataset which allows
us to identify ownership stakes held by various government entities in 27 European
countries. The constructed dataset relies on firm-level data from various versions of
the Amadeus database published by Bureau Van Dijk (BvDEP). We use the ownership
information in the database to identify state-ownership at firm-level in twenty-seven
countries over the period 2002-2012.4 We set up our procedure such that we are able
to capture the broadest possible range of state ownership (see Borisova et al. (2015)).
Hence we consider all levels of government, all nationalities of state investors, and also
keep track of investments through Sovereign Wealth funds.5 We further have a large
set of balance-sheet data and other information available for the firms as constructed
in Merlevede et al. (2015).
Various international institutions have also investigated the extent to which firms are
owned by states: see Armoldus et al. (2016), Kowalski et al. (2013), OECD (2010) and
more recently OECD (2017). Kowalski et al. (2013) uses Forbes 500/2000 data and
examines the extent to which state-owned enterprises engage in international trade
and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). OECD (2010) and OECD (2017) rely on survey
information obtained through national statistical agencies for a broad set of countries.
Armoldus et al. (2016) is most similar to ours and uses the same underlying firm-
level data to examine the relative performance of SOEs to private firms in the energy
and railway sector and for a broader set of sectors in 8 CEEC-countries.. Our analysis
is more wide-ranging and encompasses all industries in the business economy in 27
European countries. Further we rely on annual versions of the database which has a
number of advantages discussed below.6
4The countries are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), the Czech Repub-
lic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Great-Britain (GB),
Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), the Netherlands (NL), Norway
(NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Russia (RU), Spain (ES), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia
(SI), Sweden (SE) and Ukraine (UA). We restrict our attention to the business economy, i.e. firms active
in sectors with codes 10-74 of the NACE revision 1.1 classification, but exclude financial and insurance
activities (i.e. sectors 65-67).
5Although one can think of the rationales outlined in this section to be solely attributable to domestic
government entities, we do take into account a multitude of government owners. By the latter approach
we can in fact examine heterogeneity in government ownership on firm outcomes. This allows us for
example to examine the effect of ownership stakes of foreign government entities on firm performance,
as we do below.
6Armoldus et al. (2016) seems to use a single version of the database, but this is not clearly indicated
in their paper.
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Faccio and Lang (2002) and La Porta et al. (1999) are examples of earlier academic
work analysing corporate ownership structures. La Porta et al. (1999) find that large
corporations are typically controlled by families or the state. Using a firm-level dataset
spanning multiple countries, Faccio and Lang (2002) analyse ultimate ownership and
control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. La Porta et al. (2002)
assess the extent to which the largest banks are owned by governments in 92 countries
and relate this to the institutional characteristics of these countries and several macro-
economic outcomes.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we dive into our
procedure to identify SOEs. Next, section 3 documents a series of stylised facts with
respect to SOEs in all industries and all countries in Europe. The section afterwards
then relates state ownership to different country characteristics. In section 5we analyse
the financial and real performance of SOEs vis-à-vis their private counterparts through
a matching exercise, taking into account heterogeneity in government entities. Finally
section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Data source and identification of state-owned enterprises
We identify SOEs in the business economy7 in a pan-European firm-level dataset that
was constructed by compiling several annual versions of the Amadeus database by Bu-
reau Van Dijk. We have extended the work ofMerlevede et al. (2015) who providemore
details on the procedure and representativeness of the data. In Appendix A we pro-
vide some summary information on the coverage and representativeness of the dataset.
Compiling different versions of the database has a number of advantages. We are able
to cover a longer time span than the most recent ten years of data a single issue of
Amadeus contains. We are also able to properly account for the exit of firms. Firms
that leave themarket are dropped from the database after a short time period, introduc-
ing a survival bias in a single version. More importantly for our goal, a given version
of Amadeus only includes the most recent ownership structure and therefore does not
allow to track changes over time. Relying on a single issue is therefore suboptimal as
it necessitates the assumption that the ownership structure of a given firm was stable
over the previous ten years. Compiling different versions thus offers the possibility to
obtain a time series of ownership information. We use annual versions for the period
2002-2012.8 The ownership information section in the Amadeus database is our source
for identifying state-owned enterprises (SOEs).9 We consider a firm to be an SOEwhen
state (government) entities hold at least 10% of shares. We interpret state entities as
a broad concept and consider all possible entities, regardless of the nationality and
level (local, federal or regional) of the state investor (see e.g. also Jaslowitzer et al.
(2016)). We further include investments undertaken by government pension funds or
sovereign wealth funds (see Jen (2007) for an overview on sovereign wealth funds).
7We thus exclude hospitals, schools, ... We also exclude the financial sector as it is not covered in our
primary database.
8The historical data product by Bureau Van Dijk starts ownership in 2007. We also have info for the
period 1999-2002, but for most of the countries the number of available firms is changing dramatically.
Therefore we opted to start our data in 2002.
9Throughout this paper wewill use the terms SOE, government firm and ‘state firm’ interchangeably.
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We use a broad definition as a starting point, but keep track of all information which
allows us to easily narrow our definition where needed or relevant.10 Regarding the
ownership threshold, we did not find a common definition in the literature. For in-
stance Armoldus et al. (2016) uses a 20% threshold, while on the other hand OECD
(2010) uses different definitions according to the countries in the analysis. Our thresh-
old of 10% is inspired by international institutions’ threshold to discriminate between
foreign direct investment and portfolio investment.11. As we retain the exact govern-
ment share in the data we can straightforwardly change the threshold. This also allows
us to make a distinction between majority-owned SOEs and minority-owned SOEs.12
In order to identify SOEs in the data we make maximal use of the different pieces of
information Amadeus offers. First, the database offers information on direct and ulti-
mate share holders through the items shareholder type and GUO type (Global Ultimate
Owner)13. Within these itemswe find categories labelled as "State", "Public Authority",
"Government" or a combination of these indicating SOE status. For direct shareholders
we check whether the level of shareholdings meets the threshold.14 A second piece of
information is obtained through an analysis of shareholder and GUO names. Often in-
formation on the shareholder or GUO type is not available, but names are. To indicate
potential SOE status we developed a lexicon with words referring to potential state-
ownership in different languages.15. Appendix B contains the lexicon. Shareholders
with a shareholder name or global ultimate owner name containing words from the lexicon
were first flagged as potential SOEs and then manually confirmed. Again, for direct
shareholders the exact ownership share was compared to the threshold of 10%. The
final piece of information is the classification of firms by means of the item legal form in
the database. In the appendix we show the list of legal forms indicating some form of
state ownership. Adding the first two sources of information to the classification avail-
able in Amadeus substantially increases the number of SOE firm-year observations.
To illustrate and validate our identification procedure we first provide four examples
of firms identified as SOEs. We then provide a cross-country overview of a number of
listed firms with at least a single state shareholder which compares to the exercise in
OECD (2010).
10In a limited number of cases we detect gaps in annual information, most often with respect to own-
ership shares. If the information has not changed we simply fillout the gap. In case of a change in
information we carry forward older information assuming the data provider is efficient in quickly de-
tecting changes. If we have financial information that stretches back in time farther than we observe
ownership information we carry the oldest information back in time.
11See for instance the definition by UNCTAD:http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Foreign-Direct-
Investment-%28FDI%29.aspx
12We do not discard info on government ownership that does not meet the threshold. For instance if
a government shareholder owns 5% of the shares of a firm, we do not discard this information, but do
not consider this firm to be an SOE, since 5% falls below the chosen threshold.
13A Global Ultimate Owner owns at least 25% of shares either directly or indirectly or through a
combination of both and is itself not further controlled by another company. If the government as global
ultimate owner controls less than 50%+1 of shares, we say that this firm is state-owned, but notmajority-
owned.
14We require at least one individual government shareholder to meet the threshold. To determinema-
jority government ownership we sum over all government shareholders with more than 10% of shares.
15To give an example: a potential indication for a state shareholder can be "City". InDutch theword for
City is "Stad", in French "Ville", and so forth. Sowemade our procedure investigatewhether shareholder
names contain "City", "Ville", "Stad", ...
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• Proximus.16 Proximus, until 2015 known as Belgacom, is a major Belgian firm
active in the telecommunication sector and listed on the Bel20 stock-exchange in
Brussels. Our procedure identifies Proximus as an SOE based on the shareholder
type item. For Proximus this variable takes the value: ‘State, Public Authority’.
The state of Belgiumappears as a shareholder, controlling 53,5%of shares in Prox-
imus in 2007. This is confirmed in the company’s financial report of 2007. Further
shareholding is dispersed, with ownership information in Amadeus recording
more than twenty different shareholders. The actual number of shareholders is
even larger, but small (individual) shareholders are lumped together in the cat-
egory ‘Public’. The state of Belgium is recorded as the global ultimate owner of
Proximus.
• NMBS-SNCB.17 NMBS-SNCB is the Belgian public railway company. The firm
is identified as an SOE through the Global Ultimate Owner type that reads ‘State,
Public Authority’. This is reflected in the name of the global ultimate owner, the
Belgian state. The direct shareholder of this firm is the ‘NMBSHoldingCompany’
(ownership of 100%), which is ultimately owned by the Belgian state.
• FN Herstal.18 FN Herstal is a Belgian company active in the defense and hunt-
ing industry, located in the city of Herstal in Belgium. It provides an example of
multiple state shareholders and multiple levels of government. Looking at the
shareholder information from Amadeus, we find two state shareholders on the
basis of which we label FN Herstal as SOE. The first is the Walloon region (gov-
ernment) and the second the city of Herstal. Both shareholders are identified on
the basis of the shareholder type item. The city of Herstal is an example of a local
(municipal) government shareholder. The Walloon region is the global ultimate
owner of the company.
• Volkswagen.19 The German global car manufacturer Volkswagen is an example
of a firmwith state shareholders from different countries. As for Proximus above,
we observe a multitude of (domestic and foreign) shareholders. We identify two
main state shareholders. The first is linked to one of the German Länder, Nieder-
sachsen. The second state shareholder is the State of Qatar through the invest-
ment vehicle ‘Qatar Holding’. In 2009 the state of Qatar exercised a right to pur-
chase a stake in the Volkswagen group. Doing so the state of Qatar increased its
stake in Volkswagen from 0 to 17% (of voting rights). We observe this transaction
in the data through the shareholder information. The information is confirmed
in the Zephyr database20 indicating that the state of Qatar acquired of a minor-
ity stake in Volkswagen. In 2009 the domestic state shareholder, Niedersachsen,
held about 20% of shares. This information is confirmed in annual reports of the
Volkswagen Group.
Table 1 provides examples of listed firms with at least one state shareholder in the





20Zephyr is a database by BvDEP providing information on worldwide mergers and acquisitions.
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shareholder(s), the firms’ industry and size, measured by the number of employees in
2009.21 The top part of the table presents examples of listed SOEs. The table illustrates
patterns that we generalise for the entire dataset in the next section. First, we observe
SOEs in a wide array of sectors, ranging from manufacturing of food products and
medical equipment (15 and 33) over the transporting sector (60, 62 and 63) and R&D
(73). Second, we find varying levels of government among shareholders, ranging from
the federal level, e.g. the Belgian federal government in Belgacom (Proximus), to the
local level, e.g. Turun Kaupunki (village of Turun). We also observe ministries, state
agencies and pension funds among the shareholders. Third, some companies have
multiple state shareholders. E.g. the airport of Vienna (Flughafen Wien AG) has two
government shareholders (at different levels, province and local level). Fourth, while
state entities typically hold shares in domestic firms, cross-border holdings do exist, but
mostly through investment funds and not necessarily controlling participations above
10%. The Norwegian government for example in 2009 held 8.47% of the shares in the
British Axis-Shield PLC.
The resulting state ownership in our dataset matches with other sources quantifying
state ownership in particular sectors or countries such as Bałtowski and Kozarzewski
(2016), OECD (2010) and several official government sources.22 Other papers, like e.g.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015), demonstrate the strength of the ownership information
in Amadeus (Orbis) in capturing foreign ownership. While different than our focus,
this further testifies of the quality of ownership information that we find to apply to
state ownership as well. In the next sections we first provide a summarising picture of
SOEs in Europe, and then relate state ownership to country characteristics and end by
comparing SOEs and privately held firms in terms of several performance indicators.
21Due to space constraints we report two state shareholders for each firm at most. Some firms record
many state shareholders. The Italian Iren SPA for example has more than 70 local state shareholders.
For some countries, e.g. Bulgaria and Russia, the number of listed firms with a state investor is large.
Again for space considerations we restricted ourselves to two firms per country.
22Some countries publish annual reportswith a clear overviewof the firms inwhich they have invested
in, the activities of the firm, it’s realizations and the like. See for instance the website of the Dutch
Ministry of Finance: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/staatsdeelnemingen For France:



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
fin. particiaption minority majority
Note: Three year moving average from t − 1 to t + 1. Financial participation refers to a state share of
less than 10% other than through sovereign wealth funds. Participations by foreign governments and
sovereign wealth funds are excluded from the sample. Shares are calculated over all countries. The
sample is restricted to firms that report output, employment and total assets.
3 State-owned enterprises across Europe
Going through our procedure we obtain a dataset for the business economy in 27 Euro-
pean countries for the period 2002-12. When we use all firms available in the database
we observe on average 5,944,109 firms each year. Out of these, 21,377 aremajority state-
owned SOEs and 6,681 are minority state-owned SOEs. When we focus on firms that
report output, employment and total assets (and clean for negative values of these) we
retain 2,485,683 firms on average out of which 3,136 are at least minority state-owned
on average. We focus on the latter sample for the remainder of the paper unless indi-
cated otherwise. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the share of different types of state
ownership. Financial participations of less than 10% and minority participations are
reasonably stable around 0.1% of the total number of firms. There seems to be a slight
increase just after the crisis, only to diminish shortly afterwards. These evolutions are
dwarfed by the evolution of the number of majority participations for which we see a
substantial increase after the crisis. Notwithstanding thatwe observe an upwardmove-
10












fin. part. minority majority federal regional local unknown domestic foreign
Note: Averages over years. The sample is all countries, restricted to SOES that report output, employ-
ment and total assets. Participations by sovereignwealth funds are excluded from the sample. Financial
participations by governments (less than 10%) are excluded for level and nationality calculations.
ment before the crisis, there is a clear change in the trend. The share of majority partic-
ipations increases from 0.35% on average in 2005-2007 to 0.64% in 2008-2012, a finding
that confirms the observations made by Megginson (2017). Figure 2 further suggests
that state investors typically hold majority positions when investing in firms. The left
part of Figure 3 shows the distribution of government participation types. Roughly
speaking, two thirds of government ownership come in the form of majority participa-
tions. Minority and financial participations account for about one sixth each.
Figure 3 further shows the distribution of state owners over different levels of govern-
ment averaged over the period 2002-2012. For about 75% of state owners we are able
to assign them to the federal, regional, or local level.23 The federal and local levels are
most important accounting for 34.7% and 31.1% respectively. The regional government
level is much less common as investor, accounting for 7.4% on average. The regional
government’s share did increase in the later part of the period after the crisis. We also
23In order to discriminate between these different levels, we browsed through our dataset of SOEs and
assigned a level to the identified state entities. In case of doubt about the government level, we classified
the government entity in the category ’unknown’.
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 45 50 51 52 55 60 61 62 63 64 70 71 72 73 74
share (left scale) # firms (right scale)
Note: LHS: Average share over years; RHS: #firms in 2010. The sample (all countries) is restricted to
firms that report output, employment and total assets. Participations by governments of less than 10%
and by sovereign wealth funds are excluded from the sample. SOEs are both majority and minority
owned SOEs.
find 222 firm-year observations that relate to sovereign wealth funds, 90 of which in
firms that report output, employment and total assets. In the remainder we exclude
these from our sample. The second part of Figure 3 shows that state investment is very
much a national operation. Only 5% of state investment is cross-border, this figure is
stable throughout the period our sample covers and unaffected by the crisis.
In Figure 4we illustrate the importance of state ownership across different industries in
the business economy (see table D.1A and table D.1B in appendix D for a list of indus-
try descriptions). The black bars indicate the total number of minority and majority
SOEs in an industry in the year 2010, the grey bars indicate the share of SOEs out of
total firms in the sample in an industry, averaged over the sample years. In terms of
the number of firms most SOEs are observed in energy and water (codes 40-41) and
services (codes 50-74). Since the latter are also the industries with the highest number
of firms in general, the grey bars, indicating the share of SOEs to the number of firms
in an industry, provide a different image. The share of SOEs in mining (codes 10-14)












































































































































































































































































AT BE BG CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB HR HU IE IT LT LV NL NO PL PT RO RU SE SI SK UA
SOE share in TA SOE share in Y SOE share in L
Note: Averages over 2002-12 and 2-digit industries. The sample is restricted to firms that report output,
employment and total assets. Participations by governments of less than 10% and by sovereign wealth
funds are excluded from the sample. SOEs are both majority and minority owned SOEs.
tions are the tobacco industry (code 16) andmanufacturing of coke, refined petroleum
products, and nuclear fuel (23), where we observe higher shares. In utilities (40-41)
the large number of SOEs is also reflected in a high share of SOEs. Notwithstanding
a high number of SOEs in services, the share of firms is typically not very high. The
exceptions are transport and communication (codes 60-64) and research and development
(code 73).
Figure 5 complements Figure 4, but measures the economic importance of SOEs more
precisely. We do so by considering the share of SOEs in total industry assets, turnover,
and employment calculated as in equation 1. This is a measure similar to the one used
in e.g. Aitken and Harrison (1999) or Javorcik (2004) to measure foreign presence.
SOEit is a dummy variable indicating state ownership. For a given industry j in coun-
try c in year twe sum all assets, turnover, or employment (X) of SOEs and divide it by
14






While SOEit is a dummy variable indicating state ownership in equation 1, it can
straightforwardly be split into majority-minority, federal-regional-local or domestic-
foreign components to get a more detailed picture of (heterogeneous) government
presence in different industries.
Figure 5 plots by industry the average over time and countries of equation 1. While
there is some variation over the three measures, the overall findings in terms of the
number of firms in Figure 4 are confirmed: we find the biggest state presence in min-
ing, energy, transport and communication and research and development. Interesting
to note is that in most sectors there is at least some government ownership. This is
to a large extent driven by former communist countries. In Figure 6 we show the im-
portance of state ownership across countries. We use the numbers obtained from the
measure as given in equation 1, but now plot averages by country over industries and
time. Generally, SOEs are more important in Eastern Europe, with the exception of
the Baltic states and Hungary (see also Richmond et al. (2019)). Great Britain and Ire-
land on the other hand show the lowest levels of state ownership. In the next section
we examine correlations between a variety of factors, financial/institutional, and state
presence at the country-year level.
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4 State ownership and country characteristics
Notwithstanding we focus on countries in Europe in the period 2002-2012, our sample
still comprises a heterogeneous set of countries including former communist countries,
countries from the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ of Europe, large and small countries, etc. The
already non-trivial heterogeneity among the 14 Western European countries is com-
plemented and extended by 13 Eastern European countries that have been catching
up at different speeds and to a different extent with the West. This variation allows
us to relate SOE-presence at country level to other country characteristics. On the one
hand we view this exercise a further elaboration of summary statistics on the dataset,
on the other hand it serves as a raw validation of our exercise by analysing our dataset
in terms of its cross-country distribution along the lines of some findings in previous
literature.
La Porta et al. (1999) analyse how a country’s legal origin affects its institutional and
economic outcomes. They discriminate between different legal origins with English,
German, French, Scandinavian and Socialist legal origins. Even though there sample
is more international, these legal origins are present in our dataset.24 According to
La Porta et al. (1999) English common law countries should have a lower intervention-
ist government. This based on the roots of this legal tradition, i.e. the desire of the
political class to limit the power of the Crown. Countries with a socialist legal origin
lie on the other side of the spectrum. They should have the highest government in-
tervention, as the intent of groups within this legal tradition was the maintenance of
power and resource extraction (La Porta et al., 1999, p.17). Other legal origins take a
middle position between these extremes. In La Porta et al. (2002), the authors relate
legal traditions to government intervention in the banking sector, defined as the aver-
age state ownership within a country’s ten largest banks. Consistent with the historical
outline provided in La Porta et al. (1999) the socialist legal origin records the highest
government ownership in banks, while the English tradition lies on the other side of
the spectrum, with the lowest government interference in large banks.
In figure 7 we show boxplots of SOE shares in total assets (calculated as in equation 1)
over industry groups across legal traditions. While our dataset excludes the financial
sector, it includes all other business activities. In that sense figure 7 is complementary
to the analysis in La Porta et al. (2002). The top left and the bottom right panels show
SOE shares in total assets for the socialist and English legal traditions. Figure 7 indeed
confirms these two traditions as the extremes. For the socialist legal tradition we find
considerably large SOE presence across all industry groups which is bigger than for
any other legal tradition. For the English legal tradition on the other hand, we find only
very limited SOE presence. Transport and communication (60-64) is the exception with
at least some SOE presence but still considerably smaller than in other legal traditions.
German, Scandinavian, and French hold the middle ground with larger participations
in specific industry groups (specifically Energy (40-41) and Transport and communica-
tion), but not all industries as for the socialist legal tradition.
Table 2 presents the results of three regressions where 2-digit SOE shares in total in-
dustry assets, operating revenue, and employment are related to legal origin dummies.
24English - GB, IE; German - AT, DE; French - BE, ES, FR, IT, NL, PT; Scandinavian - DK, FI, NO, SE;
and Socialist - BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, RU, SI, SK, UA.
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Table 2: Legal origin and SOE shares at country level
(1) (2) (3)
SOE share in
total assets operating revenue employment
Socialist 13.004*** 10.433*** 13.009***
[0.942] [0.806] [0.998]
German 10.794*** 7.711*** 8.689***
[1.169] [0.870] [1.045]
Scandinavian 6.027*** 4.688*** 4.823***
[0.880] [0.695] [0.737]
French 4.601*** 3.009*** 4.326***
[0.747] [0.619] [0.693]
Observations 7,371 7,361 7,371
R-squared 0.390 0.385 0.416
Test for equality of coefficients
Socialist=German 3.85* 10.47*** 15.56***
Socialist=French 149.18*** 162.13*** 128.88***
Socialist=Scandinavian 70.87*** 75.06*** 102.42***
German=French 40.24*** 49.62*** 26.96***
German=Scandinavian 19.64*** 16.61*** 19.55***
French=Scandinavian 5.30** 15.03*** 1.51
Excluded category is English legal origin; regressions include year and industry fixed
effects. Bottom and top percentile for each legal tradition excluded. Standard errors
are clustered at country-year level. */**/*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level
respectively.
We control for industry and year fixed effects to account for business cycle effects and
the fact that the nature of industries implies that they are historically more prone to
government involvement (as is evident from figure 7). The excluded category is the
English legal tradition. The table confirms the overall picture in figure 7: there is signif-
icantly less state ownership in English legal tradition countries than in countries with
any other legal tradition. We find the highest point estimates for socialist legal tradi-
tion countries, F-tests reveal they are significantly different from the coefficients for
other legal traditions. Further testing reveals the following ranking: socialist-German-
Scandinavian-French-English. Note that the German legal tradition comprises only
two countries, Austria and Germany. Coverage for both countries in the database is
somewhat lower due to less stringent filing requirements. If SOEs are more likely to
report than their private counterparts this might inflate SOE-presence compared to
other countries. Nevertheless, the general result from figure 7 and table 2 is comfort-
ing in revealing the expected highest SOE presence for socialist legal origin countries
and the lowest for English legal tradition countries with other traditions in between.
In table 3 we present regression results where we relate country-level SOE shares to
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Country characteristics and SOE shares at country level
(1) (2) (3)
SOE share in
total assets operating revenue employment
A - Financial development
Domestic credit to private (%GDP) -0.053*** -0.047*** -0.053***
[0.009] [0.008] [0.009]
Stock market capitalisation (%GDP) -0.063*** -0.058*** -0.070***
[0.016] [0.013] [0.017]
Value of traded stocks (%GDP) -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.050***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.012]
B - Economic development
log GDP per capita -8.279*** -6.984*** -8.740***
[0.799] [0.653] [0.798]
Agriculture share in value added 1.688*** 1.366*** 1.710***
[0.183] [0.152] [0.186]
Services share in value added -0.507*** -0.344*** -0.409***
[0.115] [0.097] [0.120]
High tech export (% manuf. exp.) -0.298*** -0.243*** -0.307***
[0.061] [0.051] [0.062]
R&D technicians per mln. inhabitants -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
C - Institutional characteristics
Quality of government -16.739*** -10.559*** -12.958***
[3.491] [2.106] [1.966]
High Court independence -2.310*** -1.594*** -1.966***
[0.450] [0.376] [0.463]
Days required to register property 0.008* 0.006* 0.009**
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
Corruption (0=corrupt; 100=clean) -0.251*** -0.186*** -0.235***
[0.032] [0.027] [0.033]
# Procedures to start business 1.192*** 1.022*** 1.354***
[0.175] [0.145] [0.175]
Product market regulation† 8.364*** 6.048*** 7.501***
[1.158] [0.954] [1.123]
Intellectual Property Rights -5.423*** -3.609** -4.726***
[1.720] [1.441] [1.751]
Collectivism 0.171*** 0.126*** 0.171***
[0.021] [0.017] [0.021]
†A higher value implies more regulation.
Each coefficient results from a different regressionwhere country-time SOE shares obtained as an
average over NACE 2-digit industries are regressed on the variable indicated by the row header.
Column headers indicate the base variable for calculating SOE shares. All regressions include
year fixed effects. Regressions under Economic development and Institutional characteristics include
legal origin dummies as additional controls. The number of observations varies between 208
and 296 depending on the availability of explanatory variables (see table 4). */**/*** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. For definitions, description and the source, the
reader is diverted to table C.1 in the appendix.
the SOE share based on the variable in the column header, row headers indicate the
explanatory variable. All regressions include year fixed effects, regressions under Eco-
nomic development and Institutional characteristics further include legal origin dummies
as additional controls. Country-level SOE shares are obtained by averaging over NACE
2-digit industries.25 We use this setup to indicate correlations controlling for year ef-
fects.
The first three rows in panel A of table 3 introduce variables that try to capture the de-
velopment of financial markets as it comes to financing of businesses. In our samplewe
find higher levels of SOE presence in the business sector (excluding the financial sec-
tor) in countries where banks provide less credit to the private sector, where the stock
market is smaller and less liquid (as indicated by trading values).26 In less developed
financial markets we thus detect more government ownership of non-financial assets
in the business economy. These findings are confirmed for SOE shares in operating rev-
enue and employment in the business economy. The differences between the highest
and lowest in sample values for these variables are associated with a 7 to 10 percentage
points higher SOE share of total business economy assets (see table 4). These findings
are complementary to La Porta et al. (2002) who find a significant correlation between
the level of financial development of a country and the presence of governments in top
banks. When we control for legal origin in these regressions, the correlations become
insignificant. This is not surprising as La Porta et al. (2002) find government owner-
ship of banks and therefore also financial development to be related to legal traditions.
The results reported in panels B and C of table 3 come from regressions that do include
legal origin dummies as control variables.
Panel B switches attention to variables indicating general economic development. All
correlations are significant and have the expected signs. In countrieswith a higherGDP
per capita we find lower levels of SOE shares in assets, turnover and employment. This
holds controlling for legal origin and is thus not driven by differences between West-
ern and Eastern Europe. The effect is quite large, a one standard deviation higher GDP
per capita is associated with a 6.8 percentage-points lower SOE share in total assets.
Using agriculture and services shares in a country’s value added as alternative indica-
tors of economic development confirms the negative correlation between development
and government ownership of firms. The last two lines of panel B capture the level of
technological sophistication by focusing on high tech exports and the number of R&D
technicians. Both variables are associated with lower SOE shares. Overall panel B thus
suggests a negative association between state ownership and the level of development.
A large literature in economics has identified the crucial role of institutions for eco-
nomic development (see e.g. Hall and Jones (1999); Rodrik et al. (2004)). In panel
C, we look at a heterogeneous set of institutional characteristics and relate these to
government presence in our dataset. We first look at the ‘Quality of government’, an
aggregate indicator developed by the International Country Risk Guide (Teorell et al.
(2020)). It is computed as the average of variables on ‘Corruption’, ‘Law and Order’
and ‘Bureaucracy Quality’ and aims to capture different aspects of institutional qual-
25Focusing on shares averaged over industries rules out effects that potentially originate from cross-
country differences in sectoral specialisation.
26Unreported results for ATMs per capita are not as strong, but provide a similar indication. As a
metric for financial development relevant to firms ATMs per capita is however less appropriate.
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Table 4: Summary statistics of country characteristics and impact on SOE share in total
assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
increase by/from
# obs. mean St. Dev. 1 St.Dev min to max
A - Financial development
Domestic credit to private (%GDP) 272 85.10 43.79 -2.32 -10.66
Stock market capitalisation (%GDP) 208 45.03 29.79 -1.88 -8.61
Value of traded stocks (%GDP) 239 32.60 36.22 -1.52 -7.71
B - Economic development
log GDP per capita 296 10.02 0.82 -6.78 -31.14
Agriculture share in value added 296 3.21 2.44 4.12 23.75
Services share in value added 277 60.10 5.54 -2.81 -12.85
High tech export (% manuf. exp.) 296 12.70 7.63 -2.27 -11.30
R&D technicians per mln. inhabitants 230 875.34 577.59 -2.89 -11.48
C - Institutional characteristics
Quality of government 296 0.718 0.18 -3.00 -10.46
High Court independence 296 1.74 0.96 -2.21 -11.17
Days required to register property 234 66.95 111.82 0.89 7.64
Corruption (0=corrupt; 100=clean) 295 61.28 21.46 -5.39 -19.08
# Procedures to start business 260 6.92 2.68 3.19 15.50
Product market regulation 222 1.58 0.34 2.81 14.81
Intellectual Property Rights 252 4.28 0.41 -2.21 -9.27
Collectivism 274 39.52 16.90 2.89 10.60
Columns (4) and (5) indicate the impact on the SOE share in total assets using the results from
column (1) of table 3. Column (4) is the percentage point change in the SOE share due to a one
standard deviation increase in the characteristic indicated in the row header, column (5) the per-
centage point change resulting from going from the sample minimum to the sample maximum.
ity in a synthetic measure. In table 3 we find that a higher score, i.e. better quality, is
associated with lower SOE shares. An increase from the lowest value (Russia in 2002)
to the highest value (Finland in multiple years) is associated with a 10%-points lower
share of SOEs in total assets. Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that secure property rights
and equality before the law positively affect long run growth by encouraging invest-
ments in physical capital, human capital and technology. We find that countries with
a less independent high court and more cumbersome procedures to register property
also show higher SOE shares. Conversely, this implies less private activity in less se-
cure settings. Going from the lowest to the highest value in our sample is associated
with a change of the SOE share in total assets of 11 and 7.6 percentage points respec-
tively. We find a similar association for corruption. Mauro (1995) has shown corrup-
tion affects growth negatively through an investment channel. We find more corrupt
environments to be associated with higher government involvement, i.e. lower private
involvement in the business economy. Djankov andMurrell (2002) show that countries
with more limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. Countries with heav-
ier regulation are more corrupt and have larger unofficial economies, but they do not
have better quality of public or private goods. This supports the public choice view
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that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats, rather than public interest
theories of regulation. In table 3 we use the number of days it takes to start a business
as a proxy for the regulation of entry. We find that heavier regulation is associated
with more state involvement. The more encompassing OECD Product Market Regula-
tion indicator confirms the positive correlation between heavier regulation and the SOE
share in total assets, turnover, and employment.27 The difference between the highest
and lowest values in our sample are associated with a 15 percentage point difference
in the SOE share in total assets (see table 4). In table 3 we find that in our sample
countries with better protection of intellectual property rights have lower SOE shares.
This is consistent with the rationale provided in Megginson (2005), that governments
make use of their ownership stakes to protect technology. Finally, Gorodnichenko and
Roland (2011) and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) analyse culture as a determi-
nant of growth. They find that the individualist-collectivist cleavage is an important
driver of growth: an individualist culture leads to more innovation and higher growth
because of the social status rewards associated with innovation in such cultures.28 For
our sample the Hofstede indicator of collectivism (Hofstede (1980)) is significantly
associated with state involvement. More collectivist societies with a higher tendency
to strive for common goals show higher SOE shares, pointing to the potential of more
deeply rooted reasons for the prevalence of state ownership.
Overall our findings in section 4 show that on the basis of our firm-level dataset we
are able to reproduce country-level correlations that are in line with a large body of
literature on government involvement in the economy. It testifies of the quality of our
dataset that we are able to reproduce ‘macro’ findings from ourmicro dataset. We now
move to the analysis at the firm-level.
5 State-owned enterprises versus privately held firms
In this section we turn to firm-level differences between state-owned and private firms.
Our goal is to offer large sample stylised facts on ‘equilibrium’ differences between
SOEs and privately owned firms (POEs). This differs from most of the literature that
uses smaller samples and focuses on performance differences pre- and post privatisa-
tion of former SOEs (e.g. Megginson et al. (1994); Dewenter and Malatesta (2001)) or
literature using newly privatised firms that differ in remaining state shares or in the
speed of privatisation (Borisova and Megginson (2011); Ben-Nasr and Cosset (2014);
Chen et al. (2018); Boubakri and Saffar (2019)). Such studies suffer from the lack of a
proper control group. Even diff-in-diff settings, such as La Porta and López-de Silanes
(1999), provide evidence on the effect of privatisation but do not shed light on the dif-
ferences in performance levels. Furthermore, as shown by Bortolotti and Faccio (2008)
and Harrison et al. (2019) in lots of cases governments retain some form of control of
privatised firms through different mechanisms. In this section we focus on the com-
parison between SOEs that record a government ownership of at least 10% during the
27We have applied a mild correction to the OECD indicator, as one of the sub-indices of this index
captures state ownership in the economy. We discarded this item and recalculated to form the index
used in this paper.
28This result is robust to controlling for other institutions. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) further





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Number of SOEs among the 100 largest employers.
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Note: Sample restricted to firms that report output, employment and total assets.
Average over sample period. Participations by governments of less than 10% and
by sovereign wealth funds were excluded.
entire sample period and POEs that never record any government ownership.
Tables 5 shows summary statistics for the full sample for SOEs and POEs separately
and the matched sample. T-tests for equality of means between both types of firms
firmly reject for all variables at conventional levels, which is not surprising given the
number of observations. To avoid using the full sample where SOEs are number-wise
less than one percent of the dataset, we have created amatched sample. In thematched
sample SOEs arematchedwith POEswithin country-year-two-digit-industry cells. We
use total assets, firm age, foreign ownership and listed status dummies as explanatory
variables in a probit estimation (estimated by country-broad industry categories). We
then use nearest neighbour matching ensuring common support to obtain a dataset
with more than 130,000 SOE-year observations and as much matched POE-year ob-
servations.29 Depending on the exact variables used in the analyses the number of
observations drop, but typically very proportional. For example, when we focus on to-
tal factor productivity we retain 135,311 observations of which 50.81 percent are SOEs.
Since our dataset includes both SOEs and POEs and spans a wide variety of countries,
industries and firm sizes, we believe it to be free from biases that may arise in samples
that are limited in one or more of these dimensions and that are typically used in the
29Note that the matching analysis is not aimed at causality claims, but is only there to make more
meaningful comparisons.
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Note: Sample restricted to firms that report output, employment and total assets.
Participations by governments of less than 10% and by sovereignwealth fundswere
excluded. SOEs are bothmajority andminority owned SOEs. Firmswithmore than
250 employees are added to the 250 employee bin.
literature.
Before proceeding with the regression analysis we draw the reader’s attention to fig-
ures 8 and 9. Figure 8 seems to confirm the ‘common knowledge’ that SOEs are large.
We find SOEs to be overrepresented among the top 100 employers. Whereas SOEs
make up less than one percent of the total sample, we see a substantially higher SOE
presence in the top 100 in most of the countries. It is noteworthy that also according
to this metric the United Kingdom and Ireland show the lowest levels of SOE pres-
ence, while the list is topped by former communist countries with a socialist legal tra-
dition. It does not fall within the scope of this paper, but the graph does suggest that
— in the light of the literature on firm granularity (see Gabaix (2011))—- SOEs might
well be important for aggregate outcomes. Figure 9, on the other hand, testifies of
an under-appreciated fact. Notwithstanding the distribution of SOEs is skewed to the
right compared to POEs, we do observe a substantial number of small SOEs, half of
all SOEs employs less than 50 employees. While bigger firms are typically more rele-
vant to macroeconomic outcomes, focusing on a limited number of large firms tends
to under-appreciate how wide-spread and heterogeneous state ownership is.
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We now examine differences between SOEs and POEs on the basis of the matched
firms. To this end, we estimate equations along the following lines:
lnYijct = βjct+β1SOEit+β2lnAgeit+β3lnTAit−1+β4lnRevit−1+β5Foreignit+β6Listedit+εit
(2)
here lnYijct is a specific firm characteristic of firm i in industry j in country c at time t.
Firm characteristics are related to an SOE-indicator, SOE, which takes different forms
(simple dummy, but also majority-minority split, and level of government split). β1
is thus our coefficient of interest and indicates the correlation between government
ownership and firm performance. We further control for firm age, lagged total as-
sets, lagged real operating revenue30, foreign ownership and listed status. Finally we
include detailed country-2-digit-industry-year fixed effects βjct that control for a wide
range of possible confounding variables at different combinations of country, time, and
industry levels (such as e.g. business cycle effects, competition effects, ...). Fixed effects
control importantly for the competitive and regulatory setting that has been found to
affect the difference between SOEs and POEs (see the review of Mühlenkamp (2015)).
Table 6 and table 7 present results for 16 indicators of real and financial performance
of firms. Definitions of these variables can be found in table C.2 in the appendix. Both
tables 6 and 7 contain three panels, the top panel A measures state ownership by a
dummy variable set to one when state entities control at least ten percent of the shares.
Panel B splits this dummy in a dummy for majority (more than 50%) and minority
(between 10 and 50%) state participation.31 Panel C looks at the level of government
participation, SOEs with an unknown level and their matched POEs are excluded from
the sample in this case.
SOEs are generally thought to prioritise social and political objectives over efficiency.
Schleifer and Vishny (1994) stress that political interference results in excessive em-
ployment and lack of investment. Vickers and Yarrow (1991) argue for the lack of
proper incentives and monitoring of managers as a source of the inefficiency of SOEs.
Bertrand et al. (2018) find political connections to result in large amounts of resources
being directed towards excessive job creation. Columns (1) and (2) of table 6 indeed
suggest that SOEs on average employ more people and pay higher wages than their
private counterparts in the same country-industry-year cell. Employment is about
22% higher and the average wage is about 2% higher. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001)
expect SOEs to be technically less efficient than private firms because residual cash
flow claims of SOEs are not transferable. This impairs residual claimant incentives to
monitor managers. SOE employees indeed seem to be less productive as revenue effi-
ciency, measured as real operating revenue per employee in column (3), is 26% lower
than in POEs. Column (4) confirms this for a measure of total factor productivity,
see Wooldridge (2009), that is about 25% lower in SOEs. Looking at panel B we see
that qualitatively both majority andminority owned SOEs show significant differences
with POEs in the same direction. Quantitatively, differences are larger for majority-
owned SOEs. With respect to the level of government, federally-owned SOEs show
the largest differences. Regionally and locally-owned SOEs show smaller but still sig-
30We use country-2-digit-industry deflators.
31A state firm identified through the global ultimate owner is considered a majority-owned SOE.
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nificant differences.32 In the last 4 columns of table 6 we look at patenting and export
behaviour, two types of activities that are strongly related to firm efficiency. Patent in-
formation considers applications at the European Patent Office (EPO). SOEs seem less
likely to be patenting and the quality of patents measured by citations is also lower
(Bortolotti et al. (2019)). Panel B and C suggest that these differences are driven by
majority-owned SOEs and locally-owned SOEs. Minority-owned SOEs and federally
owned SOEs do not seem to underperform POEs. These results might be consistent
with the view of governments which are less keen to corporate risk-taking (Boubakri
et al. (2013)). As innovation is risky, this higher aversion for risk might be one po-
tential explanation. Moreover governments might strategically choose to (retain) hold
minority stakes in strategic innovative firms to prevent leakage of knowledge. Whereas
local governments might lack the financial capacity to aid owned firms into undertak-
ing investments in R&D. In the last two columns we find that SOEs are also less likely
to be exporters and the real value of exports is smaller. Majority or minority ownership
does not seem to make a difference, both types are outperformed by POEs. Looking at
panel C we find that federally-owned SOEs are not different from POEs when it comes
to export behaviour. As we only have export data for France and Croatia, the sample
is more limited compared to the other columns in table 6.
Table 7 shows the differences between SOEs and POEs in terms of a number of firm-
level financial indicators. Again panel A considers all SOEs as a single category, and
panels B andC focus on subtypes in terms ofmajority-minority and the level of govern-
ment. Whereas other firms have to keep an eye on the costs, SOEs may enjoy implicit
or even explicit state backing. States may interfere in case of a potential default because
the fear of job losses urges politicians to act, in turn encouraging moral hazard. Man-
agers of SOEs therefore have lower incentives for cost minimization and efficiency as
the threat of closure by state officials is simply not credible Cavaliere and Scabrosetti
(2008). Further it might be difficult to set objectives for state firms, since the owners,
elected officials in government, change over time Megginson and Netter (2001). Such
favourable conditions for SOEswere formally described byKornai (1986) in the context
of communist countries and since have been labelled ‘soft budget constraints’ (SBC).
Column 1 looks into leverage, measured as the ratio of outstanding debt to assets. We
find SOEs to be less leveraged on average than POEs. The result is stable across types
and level of government. This finding contrasts with much of the privatisation lit-
erature that finds a decrease in leverage post-privatisation (Dewenter and Malatesta
(2001); Boubakri et al. (2012)). We are however not investigating the effect of privatisation
in a limited sample with high profile cases, but looking at the average difference between SOEs
and POEs in absence of privatisation episodes. For our specific sample we do seem to find that
SOEs are less leveraged. This finding holds across a battery of checks in appendix. Column
2 looks into a direct indication of SBCs for SOEs by considering implicit interest rates
(calculated as interests paid divided by the sum of short and long run debt).33 SOEs
enjoy on average a 39 basis points lower interest rates than POEs. This is largely driven
by an effect for majority-owned SOEs and federally-owned SOEs. This suggests that
32For all three categories about 81 to 82% of firms are majority owned by the federal/regional/local
government.
33Borisova andMegginson (2011); Borisova et al. (2015) look into the effect of government ownership
on the cost of debt for a privatised and a broad sample of SOEs, finding that SOEs are charged higher
interest rates on issued bonds.
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closer ties to the relevant level of government is likely to be associated with an SBC
manifesting itself as a 50 basis points lower implicit interest rate. In column 3 we com-
pare the indicator of financial constraints developed by Mulier et al. (2016) between
firm types. This indicator has the benefit that it does not rely on stock market infor-
mation, but only on accounting and other information that is more easily available.
Therefore the indicator is well suited for our dataset with many unlisted firms. Results
in column 3 suggest that SOEs are less financially constrained than POEs. Panels B
and C reveal that this effect is mainly driven by majority and federally-owned SOEs.
Locally-owned SOEs actually record a higher score than POEs.
Columns 4 and 5 look into firms’ ability to cover their short and long term debt. The
current ratio analyzed in column 4 identifies a firm’s ability to cover its short-term debt
with its current assets. The results in all three panels show that SOEs have a signifi-
cantly lower current ratio on average than their private counterparts. This is consistent
with the idea of SBCs with SOE managers being less worried about their firm’s short
term financial position because of state backing. Panels B and C indicate some quanti-
tative differences between SOE types, but qualitatively the effect is similar. In column
5 we use solvency as a dependent variable to measure firms’ ability to meet their long-
term debts and financial obligations. In this case we do not find a difference between
SOEs and POEs. A subdivision in minority-majority ownership neither seems to mat-
ter. The level of government reveals opposite effects of federal versus local ownership.
Federally-owned SOEs have a higher score, whereas locally-owned SOEs on average
have a lower score than POEs.
Models 6 and 7 of table 7 analyse the return on assets (ROA) and the profit margin.
Return on assets is an indicator of howprofitable a company is relative to its total assets,
whereas the profit margin represents what percentage of sales has turned into profits.
The extraction of corporate resources for political objectives is known to be a burden on
a firm’s profitability (Schleifer and Vishny (1994); Boubakri and Cosset (1998); Ben-
Nasr et al. (2012)). This is what we find in columns 1 and 2 of panel A of Table 7 for
the SOEs in our dataset. SOEs’ return on assets are 3.6 percentage points lower than
POEs’ and their profit margin is on average about 9 percentage points lower. These
effects seem ‘universal’ as panels B and C reveal that majority-minority or the level
of government does not seem to matter. In column 8 we compare the effective tax
rate (calculated as taxes paid over profits) of SOEs and POEs. The regression also
controls for the profit margin in addition to the standard control variables listed in
equation 2. SOEs do seem to enjoy a significantly lower tax rate on average, but given
the average tax rate of 15%, a 0.4% seems a small effect. The result is fairly consistent
between majority and minority-owned SOEs, the level of government (remember the
sample is a smaller) reveals some heterogeneity with federally-owned SOEs paying
higher taxes and regionally-owned SOEs paying lower taxes than POEs. Again, the
effects are significant, but rather small.
In tables 8 and 9 we test whether the differences between SOEs and POEs found in ta-
bles 6 and 7 are different when SOEs are listed or owned by a foreign government. In
the former case part of the shares floats on the stock market with non-government in-
vestors being present. This introduces additional monitoring and additional pressure
on firm performance. In case the government participation is controlled by a foreign
government, we expect this participation to be motivated by financial return rather
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than the social reasons discussed above that mainly apply to national governments. In
both cases we may thus expect the effects found in tables 6 and table 7 to be mitigated.
This is exactly what we find in table 8. Most of the SOE effects in terms of real perfor-
mance are undone for listed and foreign SOEs. Only with respect to wages and export
behaviour this is not the case. Foreign SOEs actually pay even higher wages, but this is
in line with the overall wage bonus in foreign firms. For listed SOEs the effect is not sta-
tistically different from non-listed SOEs. The same holds for export behaviour (recall
the sample is limited to France and Croatia in this case). In case of financial perfor-
mance, table 9 reveals a similar finding. The significant differences between SOEs and
POEs found earlier in table 7 are mitigated or undone when SOEs are listed or owned
by foreign governments.
In table 10 we investigate whether differences between SOEs and POEs are related to
country-level characteristics. Onemay expect that countries oriented towards less gov-
ernment interventionmay provide incentives for SOEmanagers to run their firmsmore
like POEs. Castelnovo et al. (2019) find that in the telecommunications industry state
ownership has a negative effect on firm-level TFP that ismitigated or even reversed by a
favourable institutional environment. Table 10 considers in panels A, B, andC the qual-
ity of government, the number of procedures to start a business, and the indicator of
collectivism (see also tables above) as indicators of the institutional environment. The
column headings in table 10 refer to five representative firm-level characteristics: em-
ployment, TFP, wage, return on assets and the indicator of financial constraints. Panel
A shows that a higher quality of government is associated with SOEs behaving more
in line with POEs as can be seen from the opposite signs for the interaction term. A
one standard deviation increase in the quality of government results in a 3.7%-points
smaller employment difference, a 7.7%-points smaller TFP difference, a 4.2%-points
smaller wage difference, a 0.7%-points smaller ROA difference, and a 0.05 smaller dif-
ference in financial constraints. Panel B uses the number of procedures to start a busi-
ness as an indicator of government intervention. More procedures are associated with
larger employment and TFP differences. A one standard deviation increase is associ-
ated with 8.3 and 9.4%-points larger differences between SOEs and POEs respectively.
In countries with a higher number of procedures SOEs are less financially constrained,
but quantitatively the effect is small. Finally we consider the Hofstede indicator of col-
lectivism. In comparison to the previous two institutional features, one can think of
this indicator as an even more deeply rooted characteristic of societies. Moreover in
Collectivist societies one is more keen to achieving group outcomes. By using their
stakes in firms governments might use these firms to act as a vessel into achieving
these group outcomes. Panel C reveals that differences in collectivism are associated
with differences in SOE-POE differences and thus in SOE performance. In more col-
lectivist societies SOEs are bigger and pay higher wages, they are less performant in
terms of TFP and return on assets, and considerably less financially constrained.
In table 10 we have analysed level differences between SOEs and POEs. Given the
focus on institutional characteristics this seems appropriate. Government orientation
is a further likely candidate to affect SOE performance, the idea being that left wing
governments rather favour employment over efficiency compared to right wing gov-
ernments.34 As government orientation is clearly a dynamic characteristic, relating it
34Todefine government orientationwemakeuse of data byCruz et al. (2018). Left is a dummyvariable
indicating a left orientation of the largest government party in a parliamentary system. If the system is
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to level differences between SOEs and POEs seems not warranted. In tables 11 and 12
we therefore resort to a dynamic setting where we expect to be most likely observing
the impact of government orientation. Table 11 analyses differences in employment
growth between SOEs and POEs, table 12 differences in firm exit. We expect the effect
of government orientation to be especially pronounced in times of crisis. This is exactly
whatwe analyse in tables 11 and 12. The first column shows that employment growth is
smaller in SOEs than POEs. This finding is confirmed in the other regressions in table
11. Columns 2 to 4 consider an interaction term to allow the difference between SOEs
and POEs to vary across the business cycle. In column 2 we define a variable recession,
which indicates the occurrence of a recession in a country*year cell.35 Column 3 fo-
cuses on the Great Recession with GFC a dummy variable set to 1 in the years 2008 and
2009, in column 4 crisis is a dummy variable set to 1 from 2008 to 2012 taking into ac-
count the continuing crisis in Europe, especially in the Eurozone. This latter variable
captures structural breaks in the dependent. As can be seen from column 2 to 4 the
employment growth difference narrows in crisis times, likely due to SOEs responding
less in terms of job cuts. Moreover model 4 shows that this appears to be a structural
phenomena. This is confirmed in column 5 where we restrict the sample to majority-
owned, non-foreign, non-listed SOEs (and their matches). In column 6 and 7 we add
interaction effects with government orientation.36 Results suggest that in the period
after the outburst of the financial crisis, countries with left wing governments SOEs
actually show higher (or less negative) employment growth rates than POEs. Finally,
table 12 shows results for a linear probability model with firm exit as the dependent
variable. Literature in the past has already shown that politically connected firms have
a lower propensity to exit (Faccio (2006)). The structure of the table is the same as in ta-
ble 11. SOEs are significantly less likely to exit themarket than POEs, but quantitatively
the effect is not large. In contrast to our findings on employment growth, government
orientation does not seem to matter for the difference in exit probability between SOEs
and POEs. This seems logical, since politicians irrespective of their orientation are very
sensitive of firm closures.
presidential, it is 1 if the country’s president is left leaning.
35Quarterly, real and seasonally adjusted GDP data by the IMF was used to construct this binary in-
dicator. A recession was defined as a period encompassing two executive quarters of negative real GDP
growth.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Performance of state-owned versus private enterprises: Impact of country
characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
employment TFP wage ROA FinCon
A - Quality of government
SOE 0.347*** -0.524*** 0.177*** -0.060*** -0.287***
[0.011] [0.019] [0.012] [0.002] [0.014]
interaction -0.207*** 0.430*** -0.231*** 0.040*** 0.283***
[0.018] [0.027] [0.018] [0.003] [0.020]
n 243,173 120,441 157,832 229,376 138,514
R-sq. 0.739 0.711 0.771 0.091 0.355
B - # Procedures to start a business
SOE 0.003 0.045*** 0.018* -0.028*** -0.036***
[0.013] [0.015] [0.010] [0.002] [0.012]
interaction 0.031*** -0.035*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.008***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
n 184,857 120,441 157,827 174,336 138,514
R-sq. 0.756 0.711 0.771 0.108 0.355
C - Collectivism
SOE 0.153*** -0.180*** -0.075*** -0.006** 0.086***
[0.013] [0.015] [0.010] [0.002] [0.013]
interaction 0.049** -0.068** 0.214*** -0.074*** -0.449***
[0.025] [0.034] [0.022] [0.005] [0.029]
n 208,329 100,114 129,078 195,948 106,533
R-sq. 0.726 0.715 0.757 0.095 0.383
Dependent variables in logs. Monetary values in real terms. Included control variables in
all regressions: country#industry#year fixed effects, firm age, firm size (lagged total assets),
lagged operating revenue, foreign ownership dummy, listed firm dummy. Collectivism has
been transformed to vary between 0 and 1. Level effects of country characteristics are ab-
sorbed by fixed effects. */**/*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively.
Table 11: SOEs and firm-level employment growth: Impact of crisis and government
orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SOE -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.015***





SOE*crisis 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.004 -0.003





n 247,101 150,633 247,101 247,101 189,123 148,245 148,245
R-sq. 0.072 0.059 0.072 0.072 0.074 0.060 0.060
Dependent variable is the change in log employment. Included control variables in all regressions:
country#industry#year fixed effects, firm age, firm size (lagged total assets), foreign ownership
dummy, listed firm dummy. Columns (1)-(4) use the full sample of firms, columns (5)-(7) focus
on majority-owned, non-foreign, non-listed SOEs only. */**/*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and
1% level respectively.
6 Conclusion
In this article we have used raw data from the Amadeus database to develop a large
firm-level dataset to analyse government presence in Europe. We use different pieces
of information from the database, including a name/type text searching algorithm to
identify potential indications of state ownership. The dataset covers 27 European coun-
tries over the period 2002-2012. On average, in our full dataset, we annually observe
35,596 firms with a state participation; 21,377 of these are majority-owned by the state.
From 2008 onwards the share of majority-owned SOEs in the total number of firms in-
creases substantially from about 0.35% to 0.65%. For about 75% of SOEs we are able
to assign them to the federal, regional, or local government level. Federal and local
governments are most important accounting for 34.7% and 31.1% respectively. The re-
gional government level is much less common as investor, accounting for only 7.4% on
average. We also find 222 firm-year observations that relate to sovereign wealth funds.
Government ownership of firms iswidespread over the European continent. Countries
with a socialist legal origin show the highest number of SOEs and SOEs are present in
almost all sectors. Countries with an English legal origin show the lowest numbers of
SOEs. Notwithstanding an expected tendency towards concentration in the mining,
energy, transport, postal and telecommunication sectors, we do detect non-negligible
government ownership in all sectors of the business economy. Whenwe take a broader
view and examine characteristics which correlate with government presence in the
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Table 12: SOEs and exit: Impact of crisis and government orientation- Linear probabil-
ity model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SOE -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.004** 0.000 -0.000 -0.020*** -0.018***





SOE*crisis -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.008* -0.013**





n 96,563 75,052 96,563 96,563 70,621 44,822 44,822
R-sq. 0.070 0.072 0.070 0.070 0.078 0.087 0.087
Dependent variable is firm exit, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm exits the sample in the
next year. Included control variables in all regressions: country#industry#year fixed effects, firm
age, TFP, firm employment, return on assets; and if applicable to the sample foreign ownership
and listed firm dummies. Columns (1)-(4) use the full sample of firms, columns (5)-(7) focus on
majority-owned, non-foreign, non-listed SOEs. */**/*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level
respectively.
business sector, we find that lower levels of economic and financial development, and
lower scores on institutional characteristics are associated with higher levels of govern-
ment ownership at country-level. More collectivist societies also show higher levels of
government ownership. These findings all concord with the variety of theories — in-
dustrial, social, rent extraction — put forth on state ownership (La Porta et al. (2002);
Megginson (2005); Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014)).
Zooming in to the firm-level, we notice several interesting facts. While SOEs are on
average larger than privately-owned firms (POEs), half of the SOEs employs less than
50 people. Which contradicts the widespread perception that SOEs are always large
sluggish conglomerates. Through a matching exercise we show that SOEs are outper-
formed by POEs in terms of 16 real and financial firm level indicators. On average
SOEs employ more workers, are less profitable and less productive. These real and fi-
nancial performance differentials are not set in stone however. In our analyses we find
significant counteracting forces exercised by foreign government shareholders, the in-
stitutional environment and quotation on a stock exchange. In general these forces do
not seem to fully counteract the effect of governments, and thus the performance dif-
ferential between SOEs and POEs. Consistent with the idea that societies tend to use
stakes in firms in order to achieve beneficial effects for society as a whole, we find that
the effect varies along the spectrum collectivist vs individualistic society.
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In societies characterised by a higher degree of collectivism, we find that SOEs employ
more workers, have a higher wage cost per worker and are less efficient (profitable).
In times characterised by economic crises, SOEs take on a stabilising role and show a
higher employment growth than POEs. This effect holds for a variety of crisis dummies
and in addition this effect appears to be higher for countrieswith left leaning politicians
in power. Even though on average employment growth is lower for SOEs vis-à-vis
POEs, we find evidence of a structural brake for the period 2008-2012, where this gap
in employment growth becomes smaller, or even is higher for countries with leftish
politicians. When looking at the propensity to exit the dataset, we find that SOEs are
less likely to exit and that this effect is independent of the orientation— left vs right —
of politicians.
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Appendix A. Firm-level data and representativeness
Our paper relies on the AUGAMA (AugmentedAmadeus) database compiled byMer-
levede et al. (2015). In the latter paper the construction of AUGAMA is outlined in
detail as is the coverage and representativeness. This AUGAMA database on itself
is constructed by making use of several version of the Amadeus database by Bureau
Van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). This database, as well as other databases by
BvDEP37, have been used extensively in the past by researchers trying to investigate a
variety of subjects, bothwithin a certain country (e.g. Javorcik (2004) and Lenaerts and
Merlevede (2015)) aswell as over countries (e.g. Budd et al. (2005); Ferrando andRug-
gieri (2015), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) andKlapper et al. (2006)). To elaborate on the
database, Amadeus brings together a variety of information on firms: a firm’s general
contact info, balance-sheet information, the activity, ownership of the firms through
it’s shareholder structure and domestic or foreign affiliates.38 BvDEP brings all this
together trough a variety of sources: among others, the company gathers information
from statistical agencies, websites and annual reports.39 To get to the full database we
relied on for our identification procedure, we have combined several versions of the
database.40 Due to the fact that BvDEP gives each firm in the database a unique identi-
fier, we are able to link the correct information over all the versions. Several reasons can
be given why we did not restrict ourselves to the most recent version of the database.
Firstly a single issue of Amadeus includes atmost ten years of data. Alsowith regard to
ownership links between entities, a single issue of the Amadeus database only includes
a static ownership structure (Merlevede et al. (2015)). For our purposes reliance on a
single issue of the database would prove to be insufficient. Our procedure relied to a
great extent on ownership information files provided by Amadeus. For a vast amount
of firms in the database, Amadeus is able to outline the shareholders of firms in a spe-
cific year. In addition the database provides information on theGlobal UltimateOwner
(GUO) of the firm in question.
In this section we provide some information on the representativeness of the con-
structed AUGAMA database by Merlevede et al. (2015). A first indication on this can
be found in table A.1. To get an idea on the coverage of our data, AUGAMA is com-
pared to the Structural Business Statistics database by Eurostat.41 Table A.1 compares
coverage with regard to SBS over a couple of variables and broad economic sectors.
Looking at table A.1 we see that coverage varies across countries with regard to the
37The most familiar of these being the Orbis database. This database is more internationally oriented
than Amadeus, as the latter ’only’ covers European enterprises.
38Information on exports is lacking for most countries in our data. The only exceptions on this are
France and the Czech Republic. Also do note that Amadeus’ main focus is oriented towards the business
economy. The banking sector is not the main focus of this BvDEP product. To get a view on the financial
sector, one should rely on Bankscope.
39Desai et al. (2003) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) provide an overview on these sources.
40To be more specific, for this exercise versions 72, 84, 96, 108, 119, 124, 132, 144, 156, 168, 180, 192,
204, 220, and 228 were combined.
41This database collects a variety of information on firms operating in the European Union, across a
range of sectors. This information relates to business demographics, costs related to inputs and variables
related to outputs. In order to assemble the database, Eurostat relies on several sources: surveys, the of-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































variables in the table. For instance in Estonia on average we observe 86.9% of the
firms recorded by Eurostat. This figure is even higher for employment and turnover
(98.6% and 97.7%). Regarding the number of firms in comparison with financials, we
notice that the coverage for these financials are higher in general. This is an indica-
tion that AUGAMA (Amadeus) might be able to better observe and include larger
firms.42 Looking at the last four columns we compare the distribution of firms within
AUGAMAacross two broad sectors with SBS. Herewe notice that our database is more
oriented towardsmanufacturing. Table A.2 below gives information with regard to the
coverage of AUGAMA over the size distribution of firms.
For most countries considered the ranking of various size classes coincide with that of
SBS (the first group has the largest percentage, then the second...). The comparison of
the corresponding cells ofAUGAMAwith that of SBS, however indicate thatAUGAMA
is somewhat skewed towards larger firms in terms of the number of employees. This
is something we already indicated above. Again this varies over the various countries
for which there is data. For some, like e.g. Spain, Finland and Estonia, this bias is very
small. When looking at the sample for which TFP can be estimated this bias tends to
increase somewhat, but again varies across countries.
42This is somewhat logical as larger firms are obliged to by law to hand over their annual accounts to

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B. Corpus used to identify government owner-
ship
Table B.1: Words used to identifying potential state-type shareholders or state-type
GUOs on the basis of owner names.
afdeling gobierno mestská samospráva província valstija
ajuntament gmina mestsky urad provincie valsts
allam gouvernement mestský úřad provincija valstybe
alue government miasto provins valstybe
apgabals governo miestas provints valta
apygarda grad ministarstvo provinz valtio
arrondissement grevskap ministeerium prowincja varos
auktorit grofstva minister regering varos
authority grófstva ministère regeringskanslet vároš
autoridad gubernija ministrija regiao videk
autorit guvern ministrstvo região vidék
autorizacao hallitus ministry regierung ville
autorização hatalom miniszsterium region vlaams
autorytet hatosag minisztérium région vlada
avtoriteta hatóság municipal regiune vláda
ayuntamunt hrabstvi municipio regjeringen volitused
behorde hrabství municipiu republiek vyriausybe
behörde hrabstwo myndighe republic wladza
bezirk investeringsfonden nazione república wojewodztwo
bundesland investment fund nozare republika województwo
bundesrepublik igaliojimai obcina republiken xunta de
bundesregierung judet obcina republikk
by junta de obec respubblica
cetate jurisdicao oblast respublika
cidade jurisdição okres rzeczpospolita
circoscrizione jurisdiccion okrug riik
citta jurisdicción omavalitsus royaume
città kaupunginhallitus omrade rzad
Note: see the notes under the table on the next page.
47
48
Table B.1 continued: Words used to identifying potential state-type shareholders or
state-type GUOs on the basis of owner names (Cont’d.)
city kaupunki område savivaldybe
ciudad kommun opcina savivaldybe
comarca kompetence opcina sfera
comitat kormany opravneni sovereign
comune kormány oprávnění sritis
condado kozseg oras staat
county község oraš stad
departament krahvkond organ stat
departemang kraj osakond stát
departement kunnanhallitus overheid state
département kunta pais state-owned
didmiestis laani panstvo stedelijk
diputacion lääni panstwo tartomany
distrito lan parlamento foral tartomány
drzava län piirikunta the state
država land pilnvaras tinut
duchovni urad landeskreis pilseta tinut
duchovní úrad linn pilseta uprava
estado maakond pilsetas pasval urad
etat maakunta pilsetas pasvaldiba úrad
état magistrat pokrajina urbe
fylke megye principado valdiba
gemeente mesto provinca valdzia
gemeinde město province valdžia
gewest mestska samos provincia valitsus
This table and the previous one gives information on the words used to identify potential
shareholders. These words were used in the Stata procedure.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix E. Additional results for firm leverage
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